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MURDER AND THE TORT OF INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The vast majority of states have recognized the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress,' also known as the tort of outrage.2
There have been only a handful of instances, however, in which actions
have been brought seeking recovery for emotional distress stemming
from the murder of a third party. 3 Courts generally have been willing to
grant recovery on this basis only in cases where the plaintiff was both
related to the murder victim and present at the scene of the murder.4
Furthermore, one court refused to recognize an action for emotional dis-
tress stemming from the murder of a third party on the ground that the
state's wrongful death statute "occupied the field" and thus precluded a
common law recovery.5
This note discusses the extent to which a murderer should be liable
to members of the victim's immediate family for emotional distress suf-
fered as a result of the murder. After a brief description of the tradi-
tional elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, 6
this note examines the reasons traditionally given for making "presence"
a prerequisite for recovery.7 The presence requirement is said to serve
three purposes: (1) it ensures that the mental impact is anticipated by the
defendant;8 (2) it guarantees that the emotional distress is genuine and
severe;9 and (3) it provides a shield against unlimited and unduly burden-
1. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
2. See Dyar v. Florida Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 496 F. Supp. 695, 696 (N.D. Fla. 1980);
Star v. Rabello, 97 Nev. 124, 125, 625 P.2d 90, 91 (1981); Lund v. Caple, 100 Wash. 2d 739, 742, 675
P.2d 226, 228 (1984).
3. See Garland v. Herrin, 724 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1983); Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174
N.E.2d 157 (1961); Markowitz v. Fein, 30 A.D.2d 515, 290 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1968); Koontz v. Keller,
52 Ohio App. 265, 3 N.E.2d 694 (1936).
4. See, eg., Ledger v. Tippitt, 164 Cal. App. 3d 625, 642, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814, 824 (1985)
("recovery is allowed when a relative is killed or threatened with death in plaintiff's presence");
Maney v. Maloney, 101 A.D.2d 403, 477 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1984) (remanded to determine whether
plaintiff was present when brother was shot to death); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 46(2)(a) (1965) (actor subject to liability if he causes severe emotional distress to a family member
"who is present at the time" he engages in the outrageous conduct).
5. See Garland v. Herrin, 724 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1983) (interpreting New York law and
holding that actions arising from death of an individual must have statutory basis); see infra notes
84-98 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 19-83 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 26-50 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
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some liability. 10 This note argues that the first two reasons, although
supportable in cases involving nonfatal third party injuries, are insup-
portable in cases involving the murder of an immediate family member.
The note also argues that the third reason is unsound with respect to
cases involving intentionally caused death. The note concludes that be-
cause intentional infliction of emotional distress is a direct and not a de-
rivative injury, wrongful death statutes should pose no bar to recovery.
I. THE TORT OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Section 46 of the Second Restatement of Torts defines the scope of
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.11 Under section
46(1), liability attaches only if the actor, "by extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to an-
other."' 12 Section 46(2)(a) extends the cause of action to parties not di-
rectly subjected to the outrageous conduct: "Where such conduct is
directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he intention-
ally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress[ ] to a member of such
person's immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not
such distress results in bodily harm .... ,,13 Courts in most jurisdictions
have expressly adopted section 46(1) of the Restatement, 14 and the ma-
jority of courts that have addressed the issue of emotional distress stem-
ming from third party injuries have followed section 46(2).15
10. See infra notes 58-83 and accompanying text.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
12. Id. § 46(1).
13. Id. § 46(2)(a).
14. See, e-g., Northrup v. Farmland Indus. Inc., 372 N.W.2d 193, 197 (Iowa 1985) (en bane);
Neufeldt v. L.R. Foy Constr. Co., 236 Kan. 664, 667-69, 693 P.2d 1194, 1196-98 (1985); Agis v.
Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 145, 355 N.E.2d 315, 317 (1976); Hubbard v. United Press
Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Minn. 1983); Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 135, 143,
480 N.E.2d 349, 355, 490 N.Y.S.2d 735, 741 (1985); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 60, 530
P.2d 291, 295 (1975) (en banc).
15. Healy v. Counts, 536 F. Supp. 600, 602-03 (D. Colo. 1982) (interpreting Colorado law and
denying recovery because plaintiffs were not present at scene); Dyar v. Florida Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 496 F. Supp. 695, 697 (N.D. Fla. 1980) (no cause of action stated where plaintiff did not
witness the alleged bribe); Collier v. Wagner Castings Co., 70 Ill. App. 3d 233, 242, 388 N.E.2d 265,
272 (1979) (no cause of action stated where plaintiffs did not witness the alleged outrageous con-
duct), aff'd on other grounds, 81 Ill. 2d 229, 408 N.E.2d 198 (1980); Wiehe v. Kukal, 225 Kan. 478,
481-84, 592 P.2d 860, 863-65 (1979) (applying section 46(2)); Star v. Rabello, 97 Nev. 124, 126-27,
625 P.2d 90, 92 (1981) (implicitly adopting section 46(2)); Calliari v. Sugar, 180 N.J. Super. 423,
428-29, 435 A.2d 139, 141-42 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980) (explicitly adopting section 46(2));
Maney v. Maloney, 101 A.D.2d 403, 406, 477 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438 (1984) (applying section 46(2) and
remanding for determination whether plaintiff was present when brother was shot to death); Rock-
hill v. Pollard, 259 Or. 54, 64, 485 P.2d 28, 33 (1971) (en bane) (cause of action stated where physi-
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Under section 46, it is essential that the conduct be outrageous. The
commentary to the Restatement states:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outra-
geous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possi-
ble bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in
which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the commu-
nity would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to
exclaim, "Outrageous!"' 16
The requirement of outrageousness ensures that the emotional distress is
genuine and severe. 17 The need to so ensure the genuineness and severity
of the distress arises from the nature of the alleged injury. As one court
noted, "[i]t is easy to assert a claim of mental anguish and very hard to
disprove it.' i
cian grossly mistreated plaintiff's child in plaintiff's presence); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52,
60, 530 P.2d 291, 296 (1975) (en banc) (explicitly adopting section 46(2)(a)).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965).
17. See, eg., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 927, 616 P.2d 813, 819, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831, 837 (1980) (en bane); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 144, 355 N.E.2d 315,
318 (1976); Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (1961); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965).
The outrageousness of the defendant's conduct is also probative of whether the plaintiff has in
fact suffered an injury. See Hume v. Bayer, 178 N.J. Super. 310, 319, 428 A.2d 966, 970 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1981) ("Extreme and outrageous conduct by its nature produces distress in 'normally
constituted' persons against whom it is directed.").
18. Gardner v. Cumberland Tel. Co., 207 Ky. 249, 254, 268 S.W. 1108, 1110 (1925).
Courts initially were reluctant to provide redress for mental suffering because they feared a
proliferation of claims and thought that it would be too difficult to value mental distress in monetary
terms. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS
55-56 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
comment b (1965); see also Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 925-30, 616 P.2d 813,
817-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 835-39 (1980) (discussing historical reluctance to recognize independent
action for emotional distress); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 336-38,
240 P.2d 282, 285-86 (1952) (recognizing interest in freedom from emotional distress and rejecting
rule that plaintiff must be threatened with immediate physical harm in order to recover for emo-
tional distress); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 143-46, 355 N.E.2d 315, 317-18 (1976)
(discussing development of tort of outrage). See generally Magruder, Mental and Emotional Distur-
bance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936). Courts eventually recognized that emo-
tional trauma is no more difficult to value than physical pain. See, e.g., Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J.
421, 433, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (1979) ("[C]ourts have come to recognize that mental and emotional dis-
tress is just as 'real' as physical pain, and that its valuation is no more difficult."); see also PROSSER &
KEETON, supra at 55. Courts also came to realize that the floodgates argument was weak because
plaintiffs had long been allowed to bootstrap claims for mental distress by appending them to claims
for minor physical injuries. See Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 928, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838 ("If
physical injury, however slight, provides the ticket for admission to the courthouse, it is difficult for
advocates of the 'floodgates' premonition to deny that the doors are already wide open."); see also
PROSSER & KEETON, supra at 55.
Courts have sought to avoid the floodgates problem by requiring that emotional distress be
severe in order to be actionable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965)
("The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be
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II. LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY
A. The Requirement of "Presence."
Under section 46(2)(a), the plaintiff must be "present at the time"
the defendant engages in the outrageous conduct. 19 This requirement ap-
parently applies regardless of the degree of outrageousness of the con-
duct. Thus, presence is required whether the outrageous conduct is a
physical assault, a threat to kill, or a murder.20
Section 46 does contain the following caveat, however: "The Insti-
tute expresses no opinion as to whether there may not be other circum-
stances under which the actor may be subject to liability for the
intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress. ' 21 The commen-
tary accompanying this section notes that the caveat is intended to leave
open the possibility that presence may not be required under section
46(2)(a).22 An examination of the three traditional reasons for requiring
presence-to ensure that the mental impact is anticipated by the defend-
ant,2 3 to guarantee that the emotional distress is genuine and severe,24
and to provide a shield against unlimited and unduly burdensome liabil-
ity2 5-compels the conclusion that presence should not be required in
cases involving the murder of a member of the plaintiff's immediate
family.
1. Ensuring that the Defendant Anticipates the Mental Impact. In
early cases involving outrageous conduct directed at third parties, courts
required the presence of the plaintiff as well as the defendant's awareness
of such presence.2 6 It was thought that otherwise the defendant could
not be said to have "reasonably anticipated" the harm to the plaintiff.27
Courts also required a physical injury stemming from the distress-emo-
expected to endure it."). Courts have concluded, though, that the possibility of a proliferation of
claims does not itself justify denying a cause of action. See, eg., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609,
615, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558 (1969) ("[I]f a cognizable wrong has been commit-
ted[,] ... there must be a remedy, whatever the burden of the courts.").
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2)(a) (1965).
20. But see Delia S. v. Torres, 134 Cal. App. 3d 471, 483-84, 184 Cal. Rptr. 787, 795 (1982)
(cause of action stated though plaintiff did not witness wife's rape).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 caveat (1965).
22. Id. § 46 comment c.
23. See infra notes 26-50 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 58-83 and accompanying text.
26. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at 65.
27. See, e.g., Reed v. Ford, 129 Ky. 471, 112 S.W. 600 (1908). In Reed, the plaintiff overheard
the defendant threatening to kill the occupant of an adjoining room. Id. at 472-73, 112 S.W. at 601.
The defendant was not aware of the plaintiff's presence. Id. The court denied recovery, holding that
the defendant could not have "foreseen or reasonably anticipated" the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 476,
112 S.W. at 601.
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tional distress could not by itself form the basis of an action. 28 Further-
more, only certain types of mental disturbances, namely shock and
fright, were thought to produce physical injury.29 Today, however, lia-
bility extends to all forms of emotional distress, even where the distress
produced no physical injury. 30
In many situations involving nonfatal injuries, it might indeed be
unreasonable for an actor to expect the outrageous conduct to have an
emotional impact on third parties who are not present. For example,
suppose A quarrels with B's husband, C, and places a gun to C's temple,
threatening to kill him. If B were present at the scene of the incident, she
might suffer severe fright. However, if B were not present, but learned
after the fact that a threat had been made and not carried out, her reac-
tion might well be one of relief. The same result would probably occur in
many cases involving nonlethal batteries. This is not to say that a person
who discovers that his spouse has been threatened or beaten will never
suffer severe emotional distress, but only that emotional distress seems
unlikely in many situations where the plaintiff is not present to observe
the conduct.31 Thus in cases involving nonfatal injuries, the presence
Although the term "reasonably anticipate" might suggest a negligence standard, the facts of
those cases in which recovery was granted indicate that the standard employed was at least one of
recklessness. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at 65. Courts no longer inquire whether the
emotional injury was reasonably anticipated; the inquiry today is whether the defendant intention-
ally or recklessly inflicted the injury. See infra notes 33-50 and accompanying text.
28. See, eg., St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Taylor, 84 Ark. 42, 46, 104 S.W. 551, 553 (1907).
29. One court expressed the rationale for this rule as follows:
It must be conceded that a nervous shock or paroxysm, or a disturbance of the nervous
system, is distinct from mental anguish, and falls within the physiological, rather than the
psychological, branch of the human organism.... [Shock or fright affecting the nervous
system is] an injury to the body rather than to the mind, even though the mind be at the
same time injuriously affected.
Sloane v. Southern Cal. R.R., 111 Cal. 668, 680, 44 P. 320, 322 (1896). See also Watson v. Dilts, 116
Iowa 249, 252, 89 N.W. 1068, 1069 (1902) ("[F]right may... affect the nervous system, which is a
distinctive part of the physical system .... ").
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2)(a) (1965); see, e.g., Savage v. Boies, 77
Ariz. 355, 358, 272 P.2d 349, 351 (1954); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 144, 355
N.E.2d 315, 318 (1976); Hume v. Bayer, 178 N.J. Super. 310, 319, 428 A.2d 966, 970 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1981).
31. Where a tort victim suffers permanent bodily harm, the emotional distress to his family may
be severe. Thus, it may seem inconsistent to argue that recovery should be denied in such a case yet
granted where the tort victim suffers fatal injuries. However, assuming that it is desirable to have the
boundaries of tort liability clearly defined, such differential treatment may be warranted. It is much
easier to distinguish murder from nonlethal conduct than it is to make distinctions between cases
involving nonlethal conduct.
Furthermore, a person injured by nonlethal conduct will have a cause of action against the
tortfeasor for battery. On the other hand, if the person dies and is a minor or has no dependents, the
murderer will probably be immune from civil suit. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at 949
(standard recovery limited to pecuniary loss under most wrongful death statutes). To the extent civil
redress for intentional torts is punitive, see id. at 9-12 (punitive damages appropriate where defend-
ant acted with "malice" or "evil" motive), justice is served when the surviving victim recovers dam-
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requirement is sound because it is rationally related to the probability
and severity of emotional suffering caused by the outrageous conduct.
In contrast, the murder of a close relative inflicts grief regardless of
the plaintiff's presence or absence at the scene of the murder.32 Thus,
where the outrageous conduct is murder, the plaintiff's presence should
not be critical because there is little correlation between presence and the
probability of injury.
a. Intent. An actor intends that a set of consequences occur not
only when he acts with the purpose of bringing about those consequences
but also when he believes or knows that those consequences are substan-
tially certain to result from his conduct.33 Although the actor must be
aware that a particular result is substantially certain, a finder of fact may
infer from circumstantial evidence that the actor's state of mind was the
same as that of a reasonable person under the same circumstances. 34 It is
probable that in many cases the killer is aware that the murder will cause
members of the victim's immediate family-even members not present at
the scene of the murder-to suffer severe emotional distress. 35
ages. There is at least as strong an argument for a punitive civil remedy when the victim dies. Yet
because most jurisdictions adhere to the presence requirement, defendants often fare better when
they kill their victims than when they allow them to live. Cf N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 1 I-
3.2(b) commentary (McKinney Supp. 1986) (amending prior law to allow action for punitive dam-
ages to survive victim so that tortfeasor does not fare better by killing victim).
32. See Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical Injury to An-
other, 15 J. FAM. L. 163, 196-99 (1976-1977) (relationship of plaintiff and victim is the only medi-
cally sound criteria for predicting whether plaintiff will suffer severe distress upon death of victim;
presence at the scene of injury has no bearing on the medical consequences); cf. Magruder, supra
note 18, at 1044 ("Where seems little to choose between the case where the plaintiff sees a murder-
ous attack upon her aged father, and a case where, after the attack, the daughter comes home and
stumbles upon his bloody remains.").
33. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at 34.
34. Id. at 36. The Restatement provides an illustration based on the facts of Blakely v.
Shortal's Estate, 236 Iowa 787, 20 N.W.2d 28 (1945). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46,
illustration 15 (1965). In Blakely, a neighbor committed suicide in the plaintiff's kitchen. Accord-
ing to the Restatement, if the deceased was aware that this conduct was substantially certain to
result in extreme distress to the plaintiff, he acted intentionally and therefore is liable. Id. This
illustration is inconsistent with section 46(2) because the plaintiff in Blakely did not witness the
suicide.
In Blakely, the defendant's conduct was self-directed rather than directed at another. It makes
little sense to allow recovery when the defendant kills himself but to deny it when he kills another.
Compare Garland v. Herrin, 554 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 724 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1983). In
Garland, the plaintiff discovered her daughter's "hideously battered body and the blood and brain-
matter, which had been spattered about the room." Id. at 311-12. The court of appeals held that the
plaintiff's claim for emotional distress was not actionable. Garland v. Herrin, 724 F.2d 16, 21 (2d
Cir. 1983).
35. See Magruder, supra note 18, at 1044-45 ("When a murderer kills his victim, he knows that
an acute shock will inevitably be caused to the near relatives, though of course he is not acting for
that purpose.").
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To date, however, only one court has recognized that the act of
committing murder may reflect an intent to inflict emotional distress
upon members of the victim's immediate family. In Knierim v. Izzo, 36
the defendant told the plaintiff that he intended to kill her husband. He
then carried out his threat.37 Nothing in the facts of the case indicates
that the murder was committed with the purpose of causing distress to
the plaintiff. The court held that the allegations made by the plaintiff
stated a cause of action.38
The holding in Knierim illustrates an anomaly in this area of tort
law. Had the defendant not carried out his threat, the plaintiff would
have had a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.39 However, had the defendant killed the plaintiff's husband with-
out first telling the plaintiff of his intent to do so, the plaintiff would have
no cause of action unless she had actually witnessed the murder.40 This
anomaly is especially striking because the probability that severe distress
will be experienced is obviously higher in the latter situation.
In cases in which the defendant does not know that the victim is
married, it might be argued that the defendant could not possibly have
been "substantially certain" that the murder would cause the victim's
spouse to suffer severe emotional distress. The presence of the plaintiff
arguably ensures that the defendant is aware of the existence of others
who may be affected emotionally by his conduct.41 Yet this conclusion is
unsound for two reasons. First, the presence requirement is overinclu-
sive because many killers know that the victim has a family. Second,
even if the defendant does not know that the victim has a family, his
conduct is still reckless in this regard.42
36. 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961).
37. Id. at 83, 174 N.E.2d at 163.
38. Id. at 87, 174 N.E.2d at 165.
39. See, eg., Rogers v. Williard, 144 Ark. 587, 223 S.W. 15 (1920) (defendant threatened to
shoot plaintiff's husband; recovery for physical and emotional suffering granted).
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); supra note 4 and accompanying text.
41. Cf Reed v. Ford, 129 Ky. 471, 476, 112 S.W. 600, 601-02 (1908) (denying recovery be-
cause defendant was unaware that plaintiff was present in adjoining room listening to defendant's
violent threats).
42. There is yet another reason why the requirement of presence is unsound: it is inconsistent
with the doctrine of "transferred intent." Although the transferred intent doctrine has traditionally
been applied only in actions arising under the old writ of trespass, in principle it should be equally
applicable in cases involving intentional infliction of emotional distress. See PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 18, at 65 ("There seems to be little reason to apply [the transferred intent doctrine] when
the plaintiff suffers physical harm, and to reject it where there is mental damage."); Note, Application
of Transferred Intent to Cases of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 15 PAC. L.J. 147, 161-70
(1983) (arguing that transferred intent doctrine should be applied in cases involving intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress).
The transferred intent doctrine can be illustrated by a simple example. A shoots at B with
intent to harm B but hits C instead. A has committed a battery upon C; his intent to harm B was
[Vol. 1986:572
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b. Recklessness. Many cases of intentional infliction of emotional
distress involve conduct that is reckless rather than intentional.4 3 Reck-
less conduct differs from intentional conduct in two respects: (1) there
need only be a strong probability, as opposed to a substantial certainty,
that the particular harm will follow from the conduct; and (2) the actor
need not be aware of this strong probability.44 Although it may not al-
ways be substantially certain that the members of a murder victim's fam-
ily will experience emotional distress, in most instances there is
undeniably a strong probability that they will.45 That the defendant does
not know that the victim has a family should be irrelevant under a reck-
lessness standard because there is a high probability that any given victim
will be survived by immediate family members.
Several recent cases have recognized that surviving family members
may have a cause of action for emotional distress caused by an actor's
reckless failure to act. 46 For example, in Barnes v. Double Seal Glass
Co.,47 the plaintiffs' son was accidentally injured at his place of employ-
ment. The plaintiffs alleged that the employer failed to secure proper
"transferred" to C. The justification for the transferred intent doctrine derives from the wrongful-
ness of the defendant's conduct. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at 38 ("Having departed from
the social standard of conduct, the defendant is liable for the harm which follows from the act,
although this harm was not intended.").
With rare exceptions, see, eg., Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 127, 125 S.E. 244, 245
(1924) (applying the transferred intent doctrine in case involving emotional distress), the transferred
intent doctrine has been applied only in cases that involve two of the three torts derived from the old
writ of trespass-battery, assault and false imprisonment. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at
38. Thus, if X shoots A and misses B, he can be held liable for assaulting B even though he only
intended a battery upon A. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 32 comment b (1965). But ifX
shoots A and as a result causes extreme emotional distress to B, B cannot invoke the transferred
intent doctrine. The only difference between these two situations lies in the nature of the mental
injury inflicted. It is unpersuasive to argue that different treatment is justified on that basis alone.
The limitations on the transferred intent doctrine do not rest upon sound reasoning but rather upon
outdated precedent. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at 65 ("[P]robably for the simple
reason that emotional distress did not fall within the framework of the old action of trespass where
'transferred intent' arose, rarely does a case so much as mention it by analogy.") (footnote omitted).
43. See, e.g., Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974) (defendant deceitfully
obtained photograph of plaintiff for use in connection with child molesting case; although defend-
ant's purpose was not to inflict emotional distress, "[a] reasonable person.., should have recognized
the likelihood of the serious mental distress that would be caused in involving an innocent person in
child molesting cases"); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment a (1965).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 comment f (1965).
45. See Garland v. Herrin, 724 F.2d 16, 18 (2d Cir. 1983) (defendant conceded that he reck-
lessly inflicted emotional distress when he murdered the plaintiffs' daughter).
46. De Cicco v. Trinidad Area Health Ass'n, 40 Colo. App. 63, 573 P.2d 559 (1977) (refusal to
provide ambulance service to critically ill woman); Barnes v. Double Seal Glass Co., 129 Mich. App.
66, 341 N.W.2d 812 (1983) (failure to give prompt medical care to employee after work-related
accident); Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975) (en banc) (failure of physician
to give patient medical attention necessary to save her life).
47. 129 Mich. App. 66, 341 N.W.2d 812 (1983).
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medical treatment for the boy and permitted him to die in order to avoid
workmen's compensation liability.48 The court held the plaintiffs stated
a cause of action under the tort of outrage.49
Thus, ironically, surviving family members seeking recovery for
emotional distress have fared better where the death resulted from a
reckless failure to act. The presence requirement creates this anomaly.
Passive conduct cannot be witnessed; consequently, actions arising from
passive conduct, unlike actions arising from affirmative conduct, will not
fail for lack of presence.50
2. Guaranteeing that the Emotional Distress is Genuine. The
commentary to section 46(2) of the Restatement indicates that one rea-
son for the presence requirement is that "the distress of a woman who is
informed of her husband's murder ten years afterwards may lack the
guaranty of genuineness which her presence on the spot would afford."' 5'
Even assuming that the guaranty of genuineness would be absent in such
a case,52 the situation described is extremely unusual. Most persons will
learn of the murder of a spouse within hours and will suffer genuine dis-
tress as a result. Thus, the guaranty-of-genuineness justification for the
presence requirement is weak. Limits on liability should be guided by
the general rule, not the rare exception.53
Again, a distinction can be made between cases involving murder
and cases involving the infliction of nonfatal injuries. In cases involving
nonfatal injuries, it may well be true that only individuals who are pres-
ent at the scene of the incident are likely to suffer severe and genuine
distress. But in cases involving fatal injuries, particularly where the
death is a violent one, surviving family members will suffer severe emo-
48. Id. at 70, 341 N.W.2d at 814.
49. Id. at 77, 341 N.W.2d at 818.
50. In one case involving passive conduct, the court did attempt to reconcile its decision to
grant recovery with the presence requirement. In Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291
(1975) (en banc), the plaintiff alleged that his wife died because a physician recklessly failed to give
her medical attention. Id. at 53, 530 P.2d at 292. The court held the presence requirement was
satisfied because the plaintiff alleged that he watched his wife "die right in front ofhis eyes." Id. at
60, 530 P.2d at 295 (emphasis in original). The court's attempted reconciliation is unpersuasive.
The plaintiff in Grimsby witnessed only the consequences of the defendant's wrongdoing. Had the
case involved a murder, and had the plaintiff only witnessed the consequences of the wrongful act
and not the wrongful act itself, recovery for emotional distress would be denied under section 46(2)
of the Restatement.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment 1(1965).
52. Lack of knowledge may in fact intensify the suffering, as in cases involving soldiers missing
in action.
53. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) ("I hardly think it
advisable to shape general theory from the exception .... ").
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tional distress even if they are not present at the scene.54 In such cases,
presence is not necessary to ensure the genuineness of the distress.
Furthermore, requiring presence at the scene of the murder to en-
sure that the distress suffered is genuine is inconsistent with other appli-
cations of the tort of outrage. For example, merely hearing a fabricated
tale concerning the death or severe injury of a family member may give
rise to actionable emotional distress.55 The guaranty of genuineness in
such a case, however, is weak compared to the guaranty inherently pres-
ent in the case of an actual murder: in the former case, the grief will be
temporary; in the latter case, the grief will probably last a lifetime.5 6 It is
indeed anomalous that A is liable under the tort of outrage if he falsely
informs B that his child is dead, but not liable if he actually murders B's
child.5 7
3. Limiting Liability. A final justification advanced for the pres-
ence requirement is that it provides a means by which liability can be
limited.5 8 Some contend that such a boundary is needed because there
are no other means to limit liability and because public policy militates
against unlimited and unduly burdensome tort liability.5 9 The public
policy concerns are voiced in cases involving negligent infliction of emo-
54. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
55. E.g., Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954) (police officer tricked woman sus-
pected to be insane into entering hospital by fabricating story that her child was seriously injured);
Bielitski v. Obadiah, 61 D.L.R. 494 (1921) (defendant spread false rumor likely to reach plaintiff that
plaintiff's son hanged himself).
In other cases, plaintiffs have recovered for emotional distress stemming from the intentional
mishandling of corpses. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at 63; see, e.g., Herbertson v.
Russell, 150 Colo. 110, 126, 371 P.2d 422, 430 (1962) (Frantz, J., specially concurring) (noting that
it is "most anomalous" that a "parent may not be recompensed for the mental anguish resulting
from the injury or death of his or her child, but may be recompensed for such anguish where the clay
to which it has been reduced in death has been disturbed").
56. The Restatement notes that the "intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be
considered in determining its severity." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 commentj (1965)
(emphasis added). Consider the following statement by a spokesperson for a victims' group called
Parents of Murdered Children of New York State: "I buried my daughter, but I cannot bury my
anger and my pain. Time and again we see short-term sentences given to the criminals while we, the
victims, serve lifetime sentences of fear, grief and violation." N.Y. Times, April 21, 1981, at DI, col.
1; see also Young, Victims of Crime: The Great American Scandal, 23 JUDGES J. 8, 9 (1984) ("[Tlhe
families and friends who live on know that murder does not produce one victim who 'blessedly' rests
in peace-it leaves behind many life-time sorrows.").
57. Cf PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at 65 ("It is a strange distinction which.., finds a
cause of action in mental disturbance at the mistreatment of household furniture, and none in shock
at the sight of the mutilated body of a murdered sister.").
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment 1 (1965).
59. See, e.g., id.; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at 65.
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tional distress60 as well as in cases involving the tort of outrage.61 Be-
cause of the distinction between conduct that intentionally causes death
and conduct that negligently causes death, however, public policy con-
cerns should be weighed differently in each context.
In the field of negligent infliction of emotional distress, courts have
struggled to adopt rational standards for limiting liability. The difficulty
arises in drawing distinctions between classes of potential plaintiffs. For
example, if a mother is allowed to recover for the negligently caused
death of her child, can a court logically deny recovery to other close
relatives or friends of the child who also have been affected by his death?
Confronted with this dilemma, a majority of jurisdictions have
adopted the "zone of danger" limitation.62 Under this approach, a plain-
tiff may recover only if he is personally threatened with physical harm by
the defendant's negligence and only if he suffers physical injury from the
shock or fright of seeing a loved one placed in peril. 63 Some authorities
have found the zone-of-danger rule to be consistent with traditional no-
tions of duty of care.64 Courts have recognized, though, that the rule
places an arbitrary limitation on liability.65 Yet the rule retains its vital-
ity because "arbitrary distinctions are an inevitable result of the drawing
of lines which circumscribe legal duties,"' 66 and because it is believed that
public policy dictates that limitations be placed on tort liability. 67
60. See Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 163, 404 A.2d 672, 681 (1979) (public policy concerns are at
"the heart of the controversy"); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at 366; see also infra notes 62-
78 and accompanying text.
61. See, eg., Koontz v. Keller, 52 Ohio App. 265, 270, 3 N.E.2d 694, 697 (1936).
62. See Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 228-29, 461 N.E.2d 843, 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357, 361
(1984) (noting that a majority of courts have adopted zone-of-danger rule); Note, Negligent Inflic-
tion of Emotional Distress: Keeping Dillon in Bounds, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1235, 1237 (1980)
(same).
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313(2) (1965); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18,
at 365.
64. In Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984), the court
stated:
[The zone-of-danger rule] is premised on the traditional negligence concept that by unrea-
sonably endangering the plaintiff's physical safety the defendant has breached a duty owed
to him or her for which he or she should recover all damages sustained including those
occasioned by witnessing the suffering of an immediate family member who is also injured
by the defendant's conduct. Recognition of this right... involves a broadening of the duty
concept but ... not the creation of a duty to a plaintiff to whom the defendant is not
already recognized as owing a duty to avoid bodily harm.
Id at 229, 461 N.E.2d at 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 361. See also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at
365.
65. See, eg., Bovsun, 61 N.Y.2d at 228, 461 N.E.2d at 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
66. Id.
67. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at 15-17.
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A minority approach68 rejecting the zone-of-danger rule is followed
in a growing number of jurisdictions.69 This approach was first formu-
lated by the California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg.70 In Dillon, a
mother who was outside the zone of danger was allowed to recover for
shock and fear suffered as a result of seeing her child hit by a negligent
driver.71 Rejecting the majority rule, the court reasoned that foreseeabil-
ity should be the critical inquiry because duty is determined by the fore-
seeability of the risk of harm. 72 The court held that if injury to a young
child is foreseeable, then injury to the child's mother, who is likely to be
present or in the vicinity, is also foreseeable. 73 Although the court did
not explicitly limit the class of potential plaintiffs to bystanders, 74 most
courts following the Dillon approach have imposed such a limitation. 75
The Dillon approach is arbitrary to the extent that it requires the
plaintiff's presence at the scene of injury.76 As one court noted, "[T]he
instant advice that one's child has been killed or injured, by telephone,
word of mouth, or by whatever means, even if delayed, will have in most
cases the same impact. The sight of gore and exposed bones is not neces-
68. There is a third approach, known as the "impact rule," under which recovery for emotional
distress is allowed only when the defendant makes physical contact with the plaintiff. This rule has
been almost completely abandoned. See Comment, Dillon Revisited: Toward a Better Paradigm for
Bystander Cases, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 931, 933 (1982); Note, Garland v. Herrin: Surviving Parents'
Remedies for a Child's Wrongful Death-The Pecuniary-Loss Rule and Reckless Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 641, 660 (1983-1984).
69. E.g., Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375
Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me.
1982); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 NJ. 88, 417 A.2d
521 (1980); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146,
404 A.2d 672 (1979).
70. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
71. Id. at 747, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
72. Id. at 739, 441 P.2d at 919-20, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80.
73. Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
74. The Dillon court stated that three inquiries should be made:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who
was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional
impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as
contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether
plaintiff and the victim were closely related ....
Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
75. Indeed, the California Supreme Court later interpreted Dillon as requiring sensory and con-
temporaneous observation of the accident. See Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 584, 565 P.2d
122, 135, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 110 (1977). See also Madison v. Deseret Livestock Co., 574 F.2d 1027,
1032 (10th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff who witnesses only the effects of the injuries cannot recover under
Dillon approach); Shelton v. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Tenn. 1978) (no
cause of action stated where father did not witness the infliction of daughter's injuries); Schuck v.
Christensen, 80 Wash. 2d 652, 657, 497 P.2d 937, 940 (1972) (no cause of action stated where
mother did not observe sexual molestation of daughter).
76. See Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A Comment
on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477 (1982); Note, supra note 68, at 662-64.
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sary to provide special impact on a parent. '77 The public policy of limit-
ing liability that underlies the zone-of-danger rule is responsible for this
arbitrariness, though this policy plays a lesser role under the Dillon
approach.78
The policy of limiting liability in the field of negligence accords with
common sense notions of justice. Most people exceed speed limits on
occasion, or are otherwise negligent in some way; such conduct, how-
ever, rarely results in serious injury. When it does, it is probable that the
actor did not engage in exceedingly culpable conduct. Shielding the ac-
tor from burdensome liability by limiting the class of potential plaintiffs
is therefore justified in such cases.
When the conduct in question is murder, however, competing public
policy concerns enter the picture. Sheltering a murderer from liability
affronts common sense notions of justice. In light of the degree of
wrongfulness associated with murder, public policy suggests that the
murderer fully compensate all persons who are injured by his conduct.79
The fact that the murderer will be subject to criminal sanctions is
not a justification for limiting liability. Under American civil law, the
extent of liability is generally directly related to the degree of wrongful-
ness of the conduct in question.80 Moreover, criminal punishment for
murder is imposed to redress harm suffered by society at large and not to
redress harm suffered by the victim's family.8' This point is illustrated
by the fact that families of murder victims are generally excluded from
any participation in murder prosecutions. 82
This is not to argue that there should be no limitation on liability.
Certainly one can imagine cases in which it would be absurd to impose
liability. For example, the Restatement notes that the number of persons
who suffer emotional distress at the news of the assassination of a Presi-
dent may be immense.83 Although there may be a necessity to draw the
77. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 617-18, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423-24, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554,
560-61 (1969).
78. See Pearson, supra note 76, at 496-500.
79. Cf. Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 138, 125 S.E. 244, 249 (1924) ("As for public
policy, the strongest policy which appeals to us is that fundamental theory of the common law that
for every wrong there should be a remedy."); Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault as Affectaing Defen.
dant's Liability, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 586, 596 (1933) ("Justice is made more or less roughly to fit the
kind and degree of fault .... [Tihe person in serious moral fault may well be held to a high degree of
accountability.").
80. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 18, at 37 (exposure to liability is "greatest... where the
motive is a malevolent desire to do harm").
81. See id. at 7.
82. Murder is considered a crime against the state and prosecution is brought in the name of
the state. W. LAFAVE & A. Scor, CRIMINAL LAW I1 (1972).
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment 1 (1965).
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line somewhere, the line should not be drawn blindly. Eliminating the
presence requirement for the immediate members of a murder victim's
family 
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resulted.90 The Court examined the basis for the traditional refusal to
allow a civil recovery in such cases:
Legal historians have concluded that the sole substantial basis for the
rule at common law is a feature of the early English law that did not
survive into this century-the felony-merger doctrine.... According
to this doctrine, the common law did not allow civil recovery for an act
that constituted both a tort and a felony.... The doctrine found prac-
tical justification in the fact that the punishment for the felony was the
death of the felon and the forfeiture of his property to the Crown; thus,
after the crime had been punished, nothing remained of the felon or his
property on which to base a civil action.91
Because felony punishment in this country does not include forfeiture of
property, the historic justification for the rule no longer applies. 92
It might nevertheless be argued that where wrongful death legisla-
tion has been enacted, it "occupies the field,"' 93 and thus recognizing an
action for emotional distress where the legislature has not expressly pro-
vided for one would circumvent legislative intent. This argument is weak
because a wrongful death action and an action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress differ in an essential respect. The wrongful death ac-
tion has traditionally been characterized as derivative, because the plain-
tiff recovers for an injury sustained by a third party (the deceased
person).94 An action for emotional distress, on the other hand, is direct
in nature; the mental distress for which recovery is sought is an injury
personal to the plaintiff.
Several courts have expressly recognized this distinction. In De
Cicco v. Trinidad Area Health Association,95 the court noted that a
wrongful death statute is derivative while "[o]utrageous conduct... is a
personal tort in which the misconduct of the tortfeasor caused direct in-
jury to the person seeking recovery. . . .[R]ecovery for grief, and dam-
ages designed to punish are precluded in a wrongful death claim but may
be the most significant factor in an action for outrageous conduct. '96
90. Id. at 381.
91. Id. at 382.
92. Id. at 384-86. The Court concluded that the sole justification for the rule was that it had
"the blessing of age." Id. at 386.
93. See, eg., Liff v. Schildkrout, 49 N.Y.2d 622, 632, 404 N.E.2d 1288, 1291, 427 N.Y.S.2d
746, 749 (1980) ("[L]egislative enactments have pre-empted this area ... .
94. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
95. 40 Colo. App. 63, 573 P.2d 559 (1978).
96. Id. at 66, 573 P.2d at 562. See also Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 81, 87, 174 N.E.2d 157,
162, 165 (1961) (allowing plaintiff to bring actions for both wrongful death and emotional distress);
Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 54, 59-60, 530 P.2d 291, 292, 295-96 (1975) (allowing plaintiff
to bring action for intentional infliction of emotional distress though wrongful death claim was pend-
ing); cf Limino v. Milford Key, Inc., 385 Mass. 323, 334, 431 N.E.2d 920, 927 (1982) ("[E]motional
distress is a wrong to the plaintiff distinct from that done to [the decedent] and the statutory benefi-
ciaries of the decedent ....").
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And in Barnes v. Double Seal Glass Co., 97 the court distinguished the
plaintiffs' claim from derivative claims brought under the wrongful death
statute, characterizing the plaintiffs' claim as a "claim for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress... made on their own behalf, for their own
injuries, for a tort directed at them rather than at their son." 98
III. CONCLUSION
It is a harsh irony that perhaps the most outrageous of all conduct-
murder-is rarely actionable under the tort of outrage. The main obsta-
cle to bringing such an action is the requirement that the plaintiff be
present at the scene of the murder. Although the presence requirement
may be sound in other contexts, such as where the defendant intention-
ally inflicts injuries other than death or where he causes the victim's
death negligently, it is unsound where the defendant commits murder.
In such a case, the defendant recklessly and perhaps intentionally inflicts
emotional distress on the victim's immediate family. Concerns about the
genuineness of the suffering experienced by family members are mis-
placed. Furthermore, in light of the degree of wrongfulness associated
with murder, common sense notions of justice dictate that a murderer
should not be shielded from liability for distress suffered by family mem-
bers. Although there may be a practical necessity to limit liability by
drawing a line somewhere, the line should not be drawn without a rea-
soned consideration of competing public policy concerns. There is no
basis in either reason or policy to deny recovery to the immediate mem-
bers of a murder victim's family merely because they were not present at
the scene of the murder.
John W. McNamara
97. 129 Mich. App. 66, 341 N.W.2d 812 (1984).
98. Id. at 76, 341 N.W.2d at 817.

